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Abstract. Remote mobile and embedded devices are used to deliver in-
creasingly impactful services, such as medical rehabilitation and assistive
technologies. Secure system logging is beneficial in these scenarios to aid
audit and forensic investigations particularly if devices bring harm to
end-users. Logs should be tamper-resistant in storage, during execution,
and when retrieved by a trusted remote verifier. In recent years, Trusted
Execution Environments (TEEs) have emerged as the go-to root of trust
on constrained devices for isolated execution of sensitive applications. Ex-
isting TEE-based logging systems, however, focus largely on protecting
server-side logs and offer little protection to constrained source devices.
In this paper, we introduce EmLog – a tamper-resistant logging system
for constrained devices using the GlobalPlatform TEE. EmLog provides
protection against complex software adversaries and offers several ad-
ditional security properties over past schemes. The system is evaluated
across three log datasets using an off-the-shelf ARM development board
running an open-source, GlobalPlatform-compliant TEE. On average,
EmLog runs with low run-time memory overhead (1MB heap and stack),
430–625 logs/second throughput, and five-times persistent storage over-
head versus unprotected logs.
Keywords: System Logging, Embedded Security, Trusted Computing
1 Introduction
System logs record features such as user activity, resource consumption, pe-
ripheral use and error details. Logs are also used to enforce user accountability
and to establish audit trails for forensics, event reconstruction and intrusion
detection [16]. Consequently, logs are routinely targeted by attackers to con-
ceal evidence of wrongdoing, and should be stored securely to preserve the au-
ditability of a compromised system – as recommended by NIST [16] and ISO
27001:2013 [14]. Not only should logs be stored in a way that cryptographically
preserves their confidentiality and integrity, but trusted computing primitives,
e.g. Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs), have been identified as desirable in ex-
isting proposals [4,32]. Such technologies have been used for tamper-resistant
storage of logging keys, performing cryptographic operations, and providing ev-
idence of platform integrity to third-party verifiers using remote attestation.
ar
X
iv
:1
71
2.
03
94
3v
3 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
9 D
ec
 20
17
2 Shepherd, Akram, and Markantonakis
However, the advent of low-cost, mass-produced Internet of Things (IoT)
devices complicates the use of trusted computing for tamper-resistant logging.
Numerous proposals suggest using IoT devices for remote health monitoring [24],
identifying fires and gas leakages [6], and detecting falls and injuries in the
homes of the elderly and disabled [26] – all of which are natural applications for
tamper-resistant logging. Unfortunately, discrete hardware TPMs, which under-
pin many existing proposals, cannot directly host arbitrary applications with-
out additional processes, such as launching and locally attesting applications
from a TPM-backed virtual machine [4,25]. Including such processes within the
device’s Trusted Computing Base (TCB) – the set of software and hardware
components essential to its security – widens the scope for introducing security
and performance defects [21,31]. One promising solution is the Trusted Execu-
tion Environment (TEE), which offers TPM-like functionality alongside strong
isolated execution of critical applications, while using the core execution hard-
ware of conventional operating systems. TEEs have become widely-deployed in
recent years, notably in the form of Intel Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) and
TEEs built on ARM TrustZone. Indeed, Trustonic estimated that one billion
devices contained their TrustZone-based TEE alone in early 2017 [33]. However,
TEE-based logging schemes – discussed in Section 2 – have hitherto applied only
server-side TEEs to protect logs transmitted from remote devices.
In this paper, we present EmLog, which leverages the GlobalPlatform TEE
and ARM TrustZone for protecting logs at source on mobile and embedded
systems. EmLog offers further security benefits over past work, including public
verifiability of log origin, resilience to TEE key compromise, and supports secure
I/O with peripheral devices. After reviewing related work (Section 2), we for-
malise the requirements and threat model in Section 4. EmLog is implemented on
an off-the-shelf ARM development board hosting OP-TEE [19] – an open-source
and GlobalPlatform-compliant TEE that uses TrustZone (Section 6) – and eval-
uated using three datasets in Section 7. Finally, we conclude our work in Section
8 and identify future areas of research. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt
at preserving logs on constrained devices using a standardised TEE. The contri-
butions of this paper are: 1), the development of a novel secure logging scheme
for creating tamper-resistant logs with trust assurances, tailored for ARM-based
constrained devices, like wearables and sensing platforms; and 2), a test-bed
implementation using a GlobalPlatform-compliant TEE that uses ARM Trust-
Zone, with performance benchmarks across three datasets. The results indicate
that EmLog has low run-time memory footprint, five-times persistent storage
overhead, and 430–625 logs/sec throughput.
2 Related Work
Existing proposals may be categorised as: 1), secure untrusted system logging,
focusing on cryptographic methods for detecting tampered logs on untrusted
platforms; and 2), trusted logging, for applying trusted hardware primitives for
log preservation. We briefly examine key proposals and their contributions.
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2.1 Secure Untrusted System Logging
Schneier and Kelsey [27] propose the use of MACs with linear one-way hash
chains to protect log integrity. Each chain entry is found by successively hashing
the log content with the previous log’s hash, which is accompanied by a MAC
keyed under the hash of the previous MAC key. The initial key is a pre-shared
key (PSK) between the logging device and a trusted verifier, which allows the
MAC hash chain to be recomputed and verified. Bellare and Yee [3] propose
a similar scheme using the formalised notion of forward integrity in which it
is computationally infeasible to alter past entries after a key compromise. This
is achieved by updating the secret key at regular time intervals (epochs) us-
ing an update process based on a chain of pseudo-random functions to key the
log MACs in each epoch. Holt [13] proposed Logcrypt, which uses public-key
cryptography alongside MACs to achieve public verifiability, so third-parties can
authenticate the origin of log entries without knowledge of a secret PSK – short-
falls of [27] and [3]. Ma et al. [20] introduce FssAgg, which uses an aggregated
chain of signatures to achieve public verifiability and to thwart truncation at-
tacks, where an attacker aims to delete a tail-end subset of log entries. Yavuz et
al. [34] proposed LogFAS, which addresses both challenges with better storage
and computational complexity than [13] and [20] using the Schnorr signature
scheme. Recently, Hartung [12] presented four attacks against LogFAS [34] and
two variants of FssAgg [20], which enables secret key recovery and log forgery;
as a result, both schemes are dissuaded from use.
2.2 Secure Logging with Trusted Hardware
Early work by Chong et al. [7] explored trusted hardware (Java iButton) to
protect the initial PSK of the Schneier and Kelsey scheme [27]. Later, Sinha
et al. [32] suggested a using a TPM with a forward integrity scheme based on
branched key chaining. Logs are divided into epochs (blocks), each comprising
a sequence of hash-chained log entries (sub-epochs). The root entries of each
epoch are hash-chained with past epochs, which creates a two-dimensional hash
chain to prevent re-ordering attacks in which an attacker re-orders log blocks
to mislead auditors. For each new epoch, the previous epoch’s logs are securely
stored using the TPM’s seal functionality, which encrypts the logs with a TPM-
bound key so only that particular TPM can decrypt/‘unseal’ them. Bo¨ck et al. [4]
explore the use of AMD’s Secure Virtual Machine (SVM) – an early inception
of the TEE – for launching a syslog client daemon and logging application
from the TPM’s secure boot chain. The logger executes with access to TPM-
bound key-pairs for encrypting and signing log entries. Upon request, the logs
are decrypted and transmitted to the verifying party; the TPM keys are certified
for authenticating that signed logs originated from the SVM.
Nguyen et al. [23] propose streaming medical logs to a server application in
Intel SGX (see Section 3) that applies the tamper-resistance. Logs are sent to
the Intel SGX application (‘enclave’) over TLS, which computes a hash chain
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comprising a signature of each record; TPMs are used to authenticate the medi-
cal devices to the server, and on the server’s end to securely store log hash chains
using its sealing mechanism. Karande et al. [15] introduce SGX-Log, which pro-
tects server-side device logs received from remote devices. SGX-Log, like [32],
uses block-based hash chains with SGX’s secure storage for log integrity and con-
fidentiality. The authors note that continual sealing also provides resilience to
attacks in which large volumes of logs in memory are lost due to an unauthorised
power loss. Remote attestation is also suggested to authenticate the server en-
clave before transmitting the logs. The proposed scheme is evaluated using three
datasets, yielding a small (< 7%) overhead versus a non-SGX implementation.
2.3 Discussion
Modern TPM- and TEE-based approaches [23,15,32,4] still fall short of satisfying
many desirable properties identified in past work. Public verifiability of origin, as
in [4], has not been addressed in recent TEE loggers, which could be potentially
useful to authenticate system data from remote devices, e.g. generating trust
scores from log data for access control [2] and continuous authentication [22,29].
Recent TEE-based schemes, i.e. [15] and [23], focus primarily on protecting logs
after being received by a server-side log processing application; an attacker on
the source device may simply tamper the logs before reaching the server that
applies some tamper-resistance algorithm. To complicate matters, source devices
are unlikely to transmit logs in real-time to minimise network and computational
overhead, and so secure storage methods should be used to preserve unsent
logs. Additionally, TEEs typically contain other security-critical applications,
e.g. for fingerprint matching (as in Android1) and payment tokenisation (see
Samsung Pay2). As a result, a TEE-based logging mechanism should operate
with reasonable resource consumption, e.g. run-time memory, to limit the rise
of Denial of Service (DoS) conditions.
3 Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs)
GlobalPlatform defines a TEE as an isolated execution environment that “pro-
tects from general software attacks, defines rigid safeguards as to the data and
functions a program can access, and resists a set of defined threats” [9]. TEEs
aim to isolate applications from integrity and confidentiality attacks from a con-
ventional operating system. Applications in the conventional OS and TEE –
referred to as ‘untrusted’ and ‘trusted’ worlds respectively in GlobalPlatform
nomenclature – reside in separate memory address spaces, and trusted hardware
is used to monitor and prevent unauthorised memory accesses from the untrusted
world. TEE applications may allocate shared memory spaces or expose prede-
fined functions via an API mediated by a high-privilege secure monitor. Next,
we summarise the leading commercial TEE architectures.
1
https://source.android.com/security/authentication/fingerprint-hal
2
http://developer.samsung.com/tech-insights/pay/device-side-security
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The GlobalPlatform (GP) TEE maintains two worlds for all trusted and
untrusted applications. A TEE-based kernel is used for scheduling, memory man-
agement, cryptographic methods and other basic OS functions; TEE-resident
Trusted Applications (TAs) may access OS functions exposed by the GP TEE
Internal API (see Figure 1). The GP TEE Client API [9] defines the interfaces
for communicating with TAs from untrusted world applications. The GP specifi-
cations also cover the use of external secure elements (GP Secure Element API),
secure storage, and networking (GP Sockets API) [11]. One method for instanti-
ating the GP TEE is using ARM TrustZone, which enables two isolated worlds
to co-exist in hardware. This is achieved using two virtual cores for each world
per physical CPU core and an extra CPU bit, the NS bit, for distinguishing be-
tween untrusted/secure world execution modes. TrustZone provides secure I/O
with peripheral devices connected over standard interfaces, e.g. SPI and GPIO,
by routing interrupts to the TEE OS. This is performed via the TrustZone Pro-
tection Controller (TZPC), responsible for securing on-chip peripherals, and the
TrustZone Address Space Controller (TZASC) for protecting memory-mapped
devices from untrusted world accesses.
Fig. 1. GlobalPlatform TEE architecture.
Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) is an extension to the X86-64
instruction set that enables on-demand creation of ‘enclaves’ per application.
Enclaves reside in isolated memory regions within RAM with accesses mediated
by the CPU, which is considered trusted [8]. Enclaves may access the mem-
ory space of a regular OS, but not vice-versa, and enclaves cannot access other
enclaves arbitrarily. Like TPMs, SGX offers secure storage through ‘sealing’ in
which data is encrypted and made accessible only to that enclave. Remote attes-
tation enables third-party verification of enclaves and secret provisioning using
Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID) – a Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) proto-
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col by Brickell et al. [5]. SGX has been supported from the release of the Skylake
microarchitecture (from 2015).
Despite some high-level similarities, SGX is not GlobalPlatform-compliant.
Intel SGX is currently restricted solely to Intel CPUs, while the GP TEE is
typically deployed on ARM System-on-Chips (SoCs) using TrustZone, as used
by many IoT devices, e.g. Raspberry Pi 33, NEST thermostat4, and 95% of
consumer wearables according to ARM [1]. The reader is referred to [30] for a
detailed survey of secure and trusted execution environments for IoT devices.
4 System Requirements
We formalise the requirements for a TEE-based system for protecting logs on
constrained devices. The proposal should satisfy the following security and func-
tional requirements drawn from the issues identified in Section 2:
R1. Isolated execution: the system shall process logs in an environment isolated
from a regular ‘rich’ OS, e.g. Android, to provide strong integrity assurances
of the application and data under execution.
R2. Forward integrity : the integrity of a given block of logs shall not be affected
by a key comprise of a previous block.
R3. Log confidentiality : on-device log confidentiality should be preserved to pre-
vent the disclosure of potentially sensitive entries.
R4. Remote attestation: the proposal shall allow third-parties to verify the log-
ging application’s integrity post-deployment to provide assurances that logs
were sourced from an integral and authentic platform.
R5. Secure log retrieval : remote, authorised third-parties shall be able to securely
retrieve device logs with mutual trust assurances.
R6. Public verifiability : the system shall allow third-parties to authenticate the
origin of log entries without access to private key information.
R7. Truncation attack-resistant : the system shall be resistant to attacks that aim
to delete a contiguous subset of tail-end log entries.
R8. Re-ordering attack-resistant : the proposal shall resist attempts to change the
order of entries in the log sequence.
R9. Power-loss resilience: the loss of tamper-resistant logs shall be minimised in
the event of a device power-loss.
R10. Suitable root of trust : a root of trust for constrained device architectures
shall be used, ideally without requiring additional security hardware.
The threat model considers two adversary types:
– On-device software adversary : a software-based attacker that compromises
the system at time t and attempts to arbitrarily alter, forge or observe logs
produced before t. This may operate at any protection level in the untrusted
world, i.e. Rings 0–3, including arbitrarily altering execution flow and ac-
cessing non-TEE kernel space services.
3
https://www.raspberrypi.org/products/
4
https://nest.com
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– Network adversary : an adversary that attempts to arbitrarily alter, forge, re-
play or observe logs between the source device and the verifier over a network
channel, e.g. WiFi/802.11. The attacker may also attempt to masquerade as
a legitimate party to either end-point to collect logs illicitly.
Like past work, we trust the TEE and do not attempt to secure untrusted
world logs after a compromise after time t, since a kernel-mode adversary may
simply read/write directly to the kernel message buffer used to queue log entries
(see Section 5.1). We also consider hardware and related side-channel attacks,
e.g. power analysis, beyond the scope of this work, as these threats fall outside
the security remit of TEEs. The reader is referred to the GlobalPlatform TEE
Protection Profile [9] for a specification of their protection scope.
5 EmLog Architecture Design
We assume the presence of a GlobalPlatform-compliant TEE, a service provider
that provisions EmLog into the TEE before deployment, and a third-party wish-
ing to retrieve all or a partial set of the device’s logs. The GP TEE, which
maintains two sets of applications for each world, necessitates two logging com-
ponents: one that collects logs from untrusted world applications and transmits
these to the TEE over the GP Client API, and another that applies the protec-
tion algorithm within the TEE and responds to retrieval requests. An extension
to the hash matrix in [32] and [15] is proposed to apply the tamper-resistance
scheme within the GP TEE, which achieves integrity protection and public veri-
fiability (Section 5.2). Next, the log blocks are stored every n blocks, or at a time
epoch t, using the secure storage functionality of the GP TEE. After receiving
a retrieval request, the source TEE authenticates the remote verifier and vice-
versa, after which the blocks are unsealed and transmitted over a secure channel
between the TEEs (Section 5.3). We illustrate this process in Figure 2.
Fig. 2. High-level TEE-based logging workflow.
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5.1 Log Collection
A conventional (Linux) kernel uses an internal message ring buffer to store log
messages, which is made available to user space monitoring applications, such as
dmesg and klogd, using the sys syslog syscall. For user-mode logging, syslogd
listens on /dev/log, where logs are registered to using the syslog function from
the C standard library. Logs are subsequently written to file or transmitted
through the syslog protocol to a remote server over UDP. Some implementa-
tions, e.g. syslog-ng, provide further functionality like streaming logs over TCP
with TLS. For collecting untrusted world logs, we suggest a syslogd variant that
transmits logs to the EmLog TA within the GP TEE via the GP Client API.
5.2 Block Generation
We propose a variant of the hash matrix used in [15] and [32] for log sequence
integrity. Here, hash sequences are created in which each block key, bK, is derived
using a one-way hash function, h, over the previous block key and current block
ID, bID; that is, bKbID = h(bKbID−1, bID). The initial block key (bID = 0) is
derived from a device-specific Root Logging Key (RLK). Each block key is used
to derive an individual message key, k, for keying an HMAC in a similarly chained
fashion, i.e. k(bID,mID) = h(k{bID,(mID−1)},mID) for log entry mID in block
bID, up to the block size m. Note that bK is used to derive k when mID = 0.
A block-based approach provides power-loss resilience and truncation resistance
(developed further in Section 5.3) while allowing the retrieval of subsets, i.e.
blocks i to j, without transmitting all logs from the genesis block (bID = 0) to
the remote verifier.
As it stands, this scheme is vulnerable to forgery attacks if just a single
block key is compromised: an adversary can apply h on the leaked key with the
next block ID to forge subsequent blocks and entries therein. Storing RLK and
deriving keys within trusted hardware, e.g. an secure element (SE) or TPM, is
desirable, but this adds hardware complexity to already-constrained devices with
respect to raw component and integration costs. TEEs provide strong resilience
to software attacks, but, unfortunately, are not invulnerable to developer-induced
programming and API errors. The impact of RLK and block key divulgence,
however, can be limited using key derivation, as described below.
Key Derivation. We suggest a simple scheme as follows: 1), intermediate
keys (IKs) are derived from the RLK using a secure key derivation function,
each of which serves c blocks; 2), each IK derives an initial block key, bKbID,
for that block group, before sealing the IK immediately to storage; 3), bKbID is
used to generate the block’s message-specific keys; 4), the next bKbID is derived
using kdf(bKbID−1, bID) for up to c blocks, after which another IK is generated.
In past proposals, a block key disclosure would require re-provisioning RLK –
a device-specific, possibly hardware-infused key, which would affect the device
in perpetuity without potentially costly intervention. Our approach (Figure 3)
limits the damage wrought by a compromised block key by affecting only future
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Fig. 3. Proposed two-dimensional, signature-based log structure.
blocks in that group. In the worst case, besides divulging RLK, the exposure of
IK can compromise only c blocks at most.
For the key derivation function, we suggest the HMAC-based extract-and-
expand KDF (HKDF) by Krawczyk [17,18] (RFC 5689). HKDF takes keying
material and a non-secret salt as input, and repeatedly generates HMACs under
the input to return cryptographically strong output key material. Unlike plain
hash functions, used prevalently in past work, HKDF produces provably strong
key material from as-strong or weaker input key material.
Log Integrity and Verifiability. For log message integrity, first compute
hmac(`(bID,mID)) for message ` with block ID, bID, and message ID, mID, un-
der key k(bID,mID) – derived from the previous message key or, for mID = 0, the
block key. Each k should be immediately deleted from memory to limit memory
consumption and exposure. This does not prevent auditing log sequences, since
message keys may be regenerated from the pre-shared RLK.
In current symmetric-only schemes [7,15,27,32], public verification of log ori-
gin (R6 in Section 4) requires knowledge of block and message keys on all inter-
ested devices, derived ultimately from RLK. Revealing RLK is evidently undesir-
able because it enables the malicious creation and manipulation of valid blocks.
Rather, we propose signing each block with an efficient signature scheme, σ, such
as ECDSA, and a device-specific signing key-pair (pk, sk) over the concatenation
of the block message HMACs (Figure 3). This key-pair should be certified to pro-
vide data origin authentication. The RLK and key-pair should be accessible only
to the TEE, which is achievable using the TEE’s secure storage mechanism or,
for hardware tamper-resistance (with its complexities), using an external SE as
suggested by GlobalPlatform [9]. In some circumstances, logs may contain sen-
sitive data, in which case we suggest limiting verifiability to whitelisted entities,
e.g. devices from the same manufacturer or service provider. It is also observed
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that the block size, m, is inversely proportional to the number of signing oper-
ations; smaller block sizes will incur more signing operations for a given set of
log entries (see Section 7 for this overhead).
5.3 Secure Storage and Remote Retrieval
Real-time log streaming is likely to be detrimental for power- and network-
limited devices, and we suggest storing blocks prior to eventual transmission
within the TEE’s secure storage. Secure storage can be implemented in two
ways according to GlobalPlatform: 1), using the file system and storage medium,
e.g. flash drive, controlled by the untrusted world “as long as suitable crypto-
graphic protection is applied, which must be as strong as that used to protect the
TEE code and data itself” [10]. Or 2), using hardware controlled only by the
TEE, e.g. an external SE. Method 2) is resilient against adversaries that aim to
delete encrypted records from the file system5, but naturally requires additional
security hardware. For method 1), log blocks are sealed using authenticated en-
cryption (AES in GCM mode) with a key derived specifically for the TA under
execution from a separate, device-specific root storage key. This prevents other
TAs or other entities from accessing secured data, thus providing on-device log
confidentiality (R3), integrity and authenticity.
Securely storing every completed block, i.e. in [15], may yield undesirable
performance overhead for the devices targeted in this work. Rather, the param-
eters c (block group size) and m (block length) can control the number and size
of blocks kept in RAM respectively. This satisfies truncation attack-resistance
(R7) and power-loss resilience (R9), in addition to R3, by limiting the number
of new blocks kept in memory (for sufficiently small values of c and m).
In past work, log retrieval is proposed using TLS [23], or one-way remote
attestation for authenticating the platform of the remote verifier [15]. (Many re-
mote attestation protocols, e.g. [5], typically enable secure channels to be boot-
strapped, over which unsealed logs can be transmitted securely). However, the
remote authority, which may itself process logs in its own TEE [23,15], is likely
to request reciprocal trust assurances from the source TEE, i.e. remote attesta-
tion for both the source and verifying entities. Rather than performing one-way
attestation separately for both entities, one alternative is mutual TEE attes-
tation [28] in which both communicating TEEs are attested and authenticated
within the protocol run. Similarly, a secure channel can be bootstrapped from
[28] between the TEE end-points over which unsealed logs can be transmitted
securely without exposing them to untrusted world elements.
6 Implementation
We implemented EmLog using OP-TEE – an open-souce, GlobalPlatform com-
pliant TEE by Linaro [19] – with Debian (Linux) as the untrusted world OS.
5 Note that, in general, arbitrary log deletion is difficult to prevent robustly without
dedicated WORM (Write-Once, Read-Many) storage.
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An untrusted world application was developed for collecting log entries from file,
which were sent subsequently to the EmLog TA using the GP Client API [9].
Each entry was processed into a data structure comprising a 4-byte message ID,
32-byte HMAC (SHA-256) tag, and 256-byte field for the entry text. The GP
Internal API [10] was used to interface with the cryptographic and secure stor-
age methods; in OP-TEE, cryptographic methods are implemented using the
LibTomCrypt library, and we opted for secure storage in which data is encrypted
to the untrusted world file system (residing on 32GB eMMC flash memory).
256-bit ECDSA (NIST secp256r1 curve) was used to sign each block, which was
placed into a separate data structure comprising the processed messages and a
4-byte block ID; currently, only the NIST curves are defined in the GP TEE
specifications. The GP Internal API defines its own memory allocation func-
tions, i.e. TEE Malloc and TEE Free, for dynamically (de-)allocating memory
to regions accessible only to the TA, which were used frequently for memory-
managing blocks and messages at run-time.
Unsurprisingly, memory consumption quickly became problematic when work-
ing with large datasets (discussed in Section 7). For the current OP-TEE release,
32MB RAM is allocated for the TEE kernel and all resident TAs, with the rest
allocated to the untrusted world OS. For a standard TA, the Linaro Working
Group6 stipulates a default stack and heap size at 1kB (stack) and 32kB (data)
respectively, both of which can be increased up to a maximum 1MB per TA.
7 Evaluation
EmLog was evaluated using a HiKey LeMaker – an ARM development board
with a Huawei HiSilicon Kirin 620 SoC with 2GB RAM and an ARM Cortex A53
CPU (eight-cores at 1.2 GHz with TrustZone extensions). Such specifications are
typical of modern medium-to-high end IoT-type systems, such as the Raspberry
Pi 3 and Nest Thermostat. The proposal was benchmarked using three log file
datasets, described briefly:
1. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) EDGAR: Apache logs
from access statistics to SEC.gov. We use the latest dataset7 with over a
million entries (192 MB). (Mean entry length: 115.08 characters; S.D.: 5.73).
2. Mid-Atlantic Collegiate Cyber Defense Competition (CDC): IDS logs from
the U.S. National CyberWatch MACCDC event, with ∼166,000 (27 MB) of
Snort fast alert logs8. (Mean entry length: 165.27 characters; S.D.: 38.21).
3. EmLogs: Our dataset from OP-TEE OS boot, initialisation and GlobalPlat-
form test suite logs via the xtest command, and untrusted world logs from
dmesg. Over 25,000 records (1.7MB). (Mean entry length: 94.14; S.D.: 49.33).
The results are shown in Tables 1 to 4 and Figure 4. Table 1 shows the mean
CPU time to derive 256-bit IKs, block and message keys from a pre-generated
6
https://wiki.linaro.org/WorkingGroups/Security/OP-TEE
7
http://www.sec.gov/dera/data/Public-EDGAR-log-file-data/2016/Qtr2/log20160630.zip
8
http://www.secrepo.com/maccdc2012/maccdc2012 fast alert.7z
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RLK using HKDF. These were measured over 1,000 iterations within the EmLog
TA using the GlobalPlatform TEE Time method for system time, implemented
using the ARM Cortex CNTFRQ (CPU frequency) and CNTPCT (count) timing
registers. Table 1 shows the mean time for sealing and unsealing IKs and blocks
(for m = 100, averaged across all entries) via the GP Internal API. Table 2
lists the mean 256-bit ECDSA and HMAC-SHA256 times computed across all
entries, while Table 3 shows the mean creation and verification times of mes-
sage blocks for each dataset (for varying values of m, the number of entries per
block), as well as block groups. In this context, verification encompasses the time
to reconstruct the hash matrix in Figure 3 and to verify the block signatures
and message HMACs. Group creation and verification time was measured for
varying values of c (blocks per group), which included the time for sealing and
unsealing blocks to secure storage respectively. Table 4 shows the mean persis-
tent memory consumption of logs in secure storage, which was measured directly
from /data/tee in the untrusted world file system, where OP-TEE stores sealed
TA files. Lastly, Figure 4 shows the relative performance of secure storage, key
derivation and block and group creation/verification times from Table 1.
Table 1. Mean key derivation and secure storage times (milliseconds; S.D. in brackets).
Key Derivation Secure Storage Seal Secure Storage Unseal
IK Block Key Message Key IK Block IK Block
1.530 (0.067) 1.541 (0.062) 1.547 (0.088) 59.46 (3.78) 115.8 (5.36) 48.22 (2.73) 94.88 (2.80)
Table 2. Mean HMAC and ECDSA generation and verification times (milliseconds).
HMAC (SHA-256) ECDSA (NIST P256)
Create 0.056 (0.020) 20.14 (1.29)
Verify 0.059 (0.014) 20.77 (1.33)
Table 3. Mean block and group generation and verification times (milliseconds).
Block Group (fixed at m = 100)
Dataset (m =)10 100 250 500 (c =)1 10 25 50*
(1)
Create 40.14 (2.1) 70.45 (2.2) 115.6 (2.6) 198.7 (3.6) 229.4 (6.4) 1898 (30.2) 4622 (48.1) 9101 (80.2)
Verify 41.18 (1.5) 71.88 (1.7) 114.8 (1.9) 204.3 (2.1) 213.4 (5.7) 1634 (23.7) 3967 (50.0) 8302 (78.3)
(2)
Create 39.84 (1.9) 68.34 (1.7) 117.2 (1.7) 202.3 (2.0) 231.7 (7.3) 1910 (28.1) 4687 (64.0) 9323 (81.5)
Verify 40.05 (1.6) 66.15 (1.8) 119.9 (1.8) 199.0 (2.0) 215.2 (6.1) 1658 (23.8) 4046 (47.3) 8165 (73.9)
(3)
Create 42.14 (3.0) 69.07 (2.1) 118.6 (2.3) 201.9 (3.2) 230.0 (6.9) 1890 (27.0) 4621 (42.8) 9274 (79.0)
Verify 40.01 (1.6) 69.28 (1.8) 120.4 (1.8) 200.4 (1.9) 217.3 (6.4) 1656 (25.2) 4132 (48.1) 8188 (75.5)
* Heap size set to 2MB to accommodate all data. All other experiments recorded
with the maximum recommendation of 1MB.
7.1 Discussion
Little to our surprise, block generation and verification time scales linearly with
message length, which, for large values of m, is influenced heavily by the key
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Fig. 4. (a), Relative block creation and verification times versus block length; (b),
relative group generation and verification for varying numbers of blocks; (c), persistent
memory consumption for per block secure storage; (d), relative memory consumption
for group secure storage; and (e), raw key derivation and secure storage times.
Table 4. Persistent memory consumption for per block secure storage (kilobytes).
Block Sizes
(m =)10 50 100 250 500 750 1000 2500
16.38 40.96 73.73 155.65 307.20 454.66 606.21 1495.04
derivation operations (approximately 1.5ms per message, shown in Table 1). At
smaller values, e.g. m = 10, this is dominated mostly by the ECDSA overhead
(∼20ms, as per Table 2). Figure 4 indicates that the relative timing overhead is
∼80–100% for every 100 message increase in the block length.
Group creation and verification times rise significantly with the number of
blocks, c, kept in RAM before secure storage. This is driven significantly by
the secure storage overhead, which is measured at approximately 115.8ms and
94.88ms for sealing and unsealing respectively (Table 1). Despite this, however,
even the largest group sizes, c = 25 and c = 50 (2,500 and 5,000 entries in
total), completed between 4.0 to 9.3 seconds, corresponding to a throughput
of approximately 538 and 625 logs per second. At first, it seems attractive to
maximise c to avoid the expense of secure storage operations, which caused the
throughput to drop to ∼430 and 525 entries for the smallest groups (c = 1
and c = 10 blocks). Maintaining many blocks in RAM, however, increases the
impact of a power-loss; systems that log infrequently may see significant data loss
if large numbers of logs spread over a large period of time are lost. Consequently,
c should be set based on the expected log and transmission frequencies.
For memory consumption, all experiments were conducted within the Linaro
Working Group’s run-time recommendations (1MB stack and heap), except for
c = 50 blocks (5,000 entries), which required 2MB of each. Expectedly, persistent
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memory consumption of block secure storage (Figure 4) scales linearly with
message size. Our test-bed uses a fixed 256-byte text field for each log entry,
which accounts for the broadly similar performance across all datasets. We also
calculated the persistent memory consumption compared with the mean size of
raw logs; the relative consumption is large for small block sizes (m < 250), due
likely to the fixed-size meta-data used by OP-TEE to manage cross-TA secure
storage objects. For larger block sizes, this converges to slightly under five-times
overhead versus raw logs; the absolute size of smaller block sizes remains low,
however, at 16–155 kilobytes, according to Table 4.
7.2 Requirements Comparison
We compare the features of EmLog’s with previous work in Table 5 using the
requirements in Section 4. Notably, the use of ARM TrustZone and the Glob-
alPlatform TEE makes it appropriate for mobile and embedded devices targeted
in this work (R10), unlike SGX-based schemes, which are restricted to Intel
CPUs associated with laptop, desktop and server machines. EmLog satisfies the
features of related cryptographic and trust-based proposals, such as resistance
to truncation (R7) and re-ordering (R8) attacks, and public verifiability of log
origin (R6). We also offer forward integrity protection for compromised block
keys (R2) using more sophisticated key derivation, thus moving the cost-reward
ratio further away from an attacker. By avoiding TPMs, however, we relinquish
strong hardware tamper-resistance, and we urge caution of our work in high-
security domains, e.g. military and governmental use, where complex hardware
and side-channel attacks are reasonable threats.
Table 5. Security requirements comparison of related work.
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 Root of Trust
Untrusted World Schemes
Schneier and Kelsey [27] – 7 3 – – 7 7 7 – – –
Bellare and Yee [3] – 3 3 – – 7 7 7 – – –
FssAgg [20] – 3 7 – – 3 3 3 – – –
Logcrypt [13] – 3 3 – – 3 7 7 – – –
LogFAS [34] – 3 7 – – 3 3 3 – – –
Trusted Logging
Chong et al. [7] 3 7 3 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 Java iButton
Sinha et al. [32] 7 ¶ 3 3 7 7 3 3 3 7 TPM
Bo¨ck et al. [4] 3 7 ¶ 3 7 3 7 7 7 7 TPM & AMD SVM
Nguyen et al. [23] 3 7 ¶ 3 ¶ 7 3 3 3 7 Intel SGX
SGX-Log [15] 3 ¶ 3 3 ¶ 7 3 3 3 7 Intel SGX
EmLog 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 GlobalPlatform TEE
3– Satisfies requirement; 7– Does not satisfy; ¶– Partially satisfies; (–) – N/A.
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8 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced EmLog – a tamper-resistant logging scheme for
modern constrained device using the GlobalPlatform TEE and ARM TrustZone.
We began with a two-part review of related work in Section 2 by summarising
cryptographic proposals and those reliant upon trusted hardware for tamper-
resistant logging. Next, the features of TEEs were assess in further detail in
Section 3, before formulating the requirements and the threat model in Section 4
using past work. After this, we introduced the architectural design and proposed
an improved log preservation algorithm for providing public verifiability of log
origin and key exposure resilience. We described the implementation of EmLog in
Section 6 and presented indicative performance results using diverse datasets in
Section 7. For the first time, our work brings secure, TEE-based logging to mobile
and embedded devices, and protects against strong software-based untrusted
world and network adversaries. Our evaluation shows that EmLog yields five-
times persistent storage overhead versus raw logs for applying tamper-resistance;
runs within reasonable run-time memory constraints for TEE applications, as
stipulated by the Linaro Working Group; and has a throughput of up to 625
logs/sec. In future work, we aim to investigate the following avenues:
– Group logging schemes for multiple devices. Expand EmLog to allow se-
cure and efficient sharing of logs with nearby devices. This could be used in
schemes that compute trust scores prior to making group decisions [2], e.g.
authenticating users via contextual data from multiple wearable devices.
– Privacy-preserving log usage. At present, devices that wish to use logs will
receive raw logs, which may reveal privacy-sensitive data. In future work, we
aim to explore privacy-preserving methods for using logs without exposing
raw entries to other devices.
– TEE performance comparison. We hope to evaluate EmLog under other TEE
instantiations, namely Intel SGX and other GP-compliant TEEs, such as
TrustTonic’s Kinibi, especially for micro-controllers on low-end IoT devices.
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